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Abstract 
We anatomise the culture of skilled work in the Solheimsviken shipyard in Bergen, 
Norway, from 1945 to 1990, linking it to democratic impulses within the workforce.  This 
independent culture had strong if bounded democratic elements that were ultimately 
reflected in the institutions of a workers’ cooperative which operated from1985.  
However, a shift away from shipbuilding immediately preceded the cooperative’s 
foundation and eroded the position of the older skilled workers who had carried the 
culture, undermining it even before the cooperative’s collapse.   
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Introduction 
We examine the culture of work amongst skilled workers in a major Norwegian shipyard, 
arguing that it underpinned their democratic institutions.  In the mid-1980s, the yard became 
worker-owned but by that point the culture was already substantially undermined by seismic 
changes in production processes.   
The case is not presented as in any way ‘typical’.  Indeed, Norway’s strong labour 
movement means that it is likely to be distinctive in a broad international context although it 
appears that, given extensive commonalities in the history of West European shipbuilding, the 
culture considered here had much in common with those in other workplaces.  Our aim is to 
reconstruct the industrial culture of skilled work in one workplace and show the extent, nature 
and limits of its democratic aspects before it was destroyed by global competition.  Strong 
historic links existed between worker identities, their self-image as highly skilled craftsmen and 
their attachment to industrial and political democracy both inside and outside of the yard.  We 
therefore show how a culture often described by business historians as underpinning ‘restrictive 
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practices’ within shipbuilding (see for example the British Conservative historian Barnett1) had 
an industrial democratic dimension.   
Some ‘cultures of labour’ have been identified as shared between management and 
employees (see for example Shershneva and Feldhoff )
2
, and have been argued to have assisted 
in making major systemic transitions.  Analysts of worker cooperatives have also proceeded by 
reference to the ‘organisational culture’ concept widely used in management studies (Gherardi 
and Masiero)
3
.  The culture we seek to reconstruct here might in these latter terms be described 
as a ‘sub-culture’ since, consistent with one influential interpretation of culture’s operation in 
organizations, it was an independent worker culture developed to protect workers from 
management (Smircich, 1983)
4
.  In our case, management recognised its existence, sought to 
encompass it within an organisational identity and tried to tap into it when seeking to improve 
productivity.  Managers could even on occasions identify with it.  Nevertheless, it remained at 
its core an expression of worker identity.   
We show the links between this culture and the yard’s eventual conversion to a worker-
owned company and-in its own definition- a worker cooperative.  Worker cooperatives, being 
as old as industrialisation itself, have a substantial history and have been the subject of much 
academic study over an unusually extended period.  Since the 2009 financial crisis led many 
across the world to seek alternative models, political and academic interest in them has grown 
considerably.  Rothschild (2009)
5
 for example took a positive view of worker cooperatives’ 
political effects, advocating them as a means of expanding political participation beyond 
industry and suggesting that state policy should therefore support them.  A pair of researchers 
reviewing Argentinian experience recently even proposed that worker cooperatives posed 
                                                          
1. Barnett, The Audit of War. 
2. Shershneva and Feldhoff, The Culture of Labour. 
3. Gherardi and Masiero, The Impact of Organizational. 
4 . Smircich, Concepts of Culture. 
5 . Rothschild, Workers’ Cooperatives.. 
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significant questions the answers to which could have potential to revive the industrial 
sociology field (Ozarow and Croucher, 2014)
6
.   
Worker cooperatives may be seen in different perspectives.  Here, we take an historical 
approach, on the grounds that workplace history is important to their foundation and operation.  
Within the extensive and long-running literature, much research adopts more economic and 
industrial-sociological viewpoints.  As Craig and Pencavel (1995)
7
 noted two decades ago (and 
this remains the case), strangely, the concrete forms of cooperation are frequently given only 
cursory attention.  When cultural analysis of cooperatives’ operation has been undertaken, the 
approach is frequently limited to the cooperative’s history from its foundation, setting aside the 
structures and cultures which it inherited.  Gherardi and Masiero (1987)
8
 for example found 
two types of cooperative, resting on different organizational bases: the foundation and the 
coalition.  In the former, the founder members’ relationships were central but in the latter the 
coop was considered to simply rest on an attempt to save jobs.  The antecedents of these bases 
were not investigated.  In our case, as we show, the yard’s democratic life was already in 
decline, undermined inter alia by radically changed skills requirements, before the cooperative 
was formed.    
We also respond to a little-heeded call to examine the significance of workers’ cultures 
in company history (Biggs, 2000)
9
.  We adopt a definition of culture—the ‘symbolic expressive 
aspect of social behaviour’—supported by Wuthnow and Witten (1988)10 and apply two of the 
methodological approaches which they identify as viable: the subjective and institutional.  Our 
conception of culture therefore fully embraces institutions.  We suggest that a ‘culture’ of work 
is not simply a matter of shared assumptions or of other ‘soft’ phenomena such as symbols or 
                                                          
6 . Ozarow and Croucher, Workers' Self-management. 
7 . Craig and Pencavel, Participation and Productivity. 
8.  Gherardi and Masiero, “The Impact.” 
9 . Biggs, Review of Charles F. 
10 . Wuthnow and Witten, “New Directions.” 
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rituals and routines, but includes ‘hard’ institutional manifestations.  Our work therefore builds 
on the tradition of those ‘old’ institutional theoreticians who, when building the foundations of 
industrial sociology and industrial relations, recognised a need to study the historical 
development of workers’ institutions (Webb and Webb, 189411; Clegg, Fox and Thompson 
1964,
12
 1987;
13
 Clegg: 1994
14
).  However, unlike them we focus on the micro rather than the 
macro level.  
We argue that the co-operative’s foundation should be placed firmly in its historical 
context as the culmination of longer-term traditions within the local workers’ culture of work.  
Equally, we make a case for a more historical conception of cooperatives’ origins at the 
workplace level.   The paper is structured as follows.  We begin by explaining our method and 
then locate the shipyard in its broader historical context as part of the Norwegian shipbuilding 
industry, placing it in its local cultural setting.  We then focus on the internal culture of work in 
the period immediately prior to the worker cooperative’s formation.  Workers’ democratic 
institutions within the cooperative are examined before we summarise and conclude.   
 
Method 
Since our research places the history of one cooperative in a longer-term perspective and is also 
concerned with more recent developments, we used two methodological approaches.  In 
relation to the first strand we used several rich secondary sources in the Norwegian and English 
languages documenting the histories of the industry and the yard.  We were fortunate to be able 
to draw on ethnographic studies by a researcher and her collaborator who worked and took 
photographs in the workplace.  In relation to the more contemporary aspects of worker 
                                                          
11 . Webb and Webb, The History of Trade Unions. 
12 . Clegg, Fox and Thompson, A History of British. 
13 . Clegg, Fox and Thompson, A History of British. 
14 . Clegg, A History of British. 
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experience, we used a range of different sources.  First, one of the authors spent a short period 
working and observing work and social relations in the yard in the 1970s.  Second, interviews 
were held in October 1986 with three individuals with much experience of the workplace; two 
had been central to the cooperative’s formation and operation throughout its life. Ole Egesund 
led the largest union (Iron and Steel), and was a board member of the Aker Group for many 
years prior to the transfer of ownership from Aker to local firms in Bergen.  He was one of five 
members of the negotiating committee dealing with the ownership transfer to becoming a 
cooperative. At the time of interviewing, he had worked at Solheimsviken for 27 years.  A 
second important respondent was Kjell Høibraaten, a sheet metal worker and (until the late 
1980s) a Marxist, at Solheimsviken from 1970 until he assumed the role of local deputy union 
leader for both Iron and Steel and the union ‘club’ coordinating all unions. He was heavily 
involved in managing the cooperative. We also interviewed a shop floor worker, Roger 
Ingvaldsen, who had worked as a certified welder at the yard since 1958. Third, surveys of 
workers’ experience were conducted in the Solheimsviken shipyard and its sister yard 
Laksevaag in October 1986; the latter yard was part of the same shipbuilding firm as the former 
but remained in private ownership after the cooperative was formed, presenting a useful 
contrast.  Fourth, local and national newspapers were greatly interested in Solheimsviken 
because of the yard’s local and national significance.  They were therefore used in tandem with 
a workplace newspaper published in the period 1982-1988 which helped to throw light on the 
social relations of production and democratic governance of the cooperative in those years.       
 
The Norwegian shipbuilding industry and its skilled workers 
The Norwegian shipbuilding industry developed from 1850 onwards, experiencing accelerated 
growth immediately before the First World War and again in 1945.  We focus on the post-1945 
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period, when the major technological change from riveting to welding ships together was well-
established.  In European terms the Norwegian industry declined late, from 1990 onwards and 
survives today; the British industry, which provided something of a model for it until the 1950s, 
also survives albeit much reduced in scale.  It arguably began its decline decades earlier 
(Lorenz, 1994)
15
.   
The industry was divided into two principal regions, both on the Western coast; in the 
more northerly of the two, it focused on serving local fishing and coastal shipping. In the more 
southerly region it grew from similar local roots but post-1945 it centred on a more 
international market and produced larger vessels.  In both cases, the industry drew on local 
sources of finance and benefitted from strong links with the brokers, insurance clubs, 
consultants and classification societies that supported shipbuilding and provided a pool of 
expertise for informing the creation of cooperatives (Andersen, 1997: 464)
16
.  It also enjoyed 
extensive connections with the shipping industry and with other shipbuilding and marine 
engineering companies; the latter was especially significant for the Southerly form of 
shipbuilding.  Strong inter-firm relations existed between the yard on the one hand and 
shipping companies and supplier organisations on the other, forming a ‘maritime complex’ 
(Andersen, 1997: 480)
17
.  It has been suggested by a local expert that cultural and institutional 
sources of support assisted the Southern region, manifested in strong familial and community 
relations and a tradition of communal entrepreneurship (Karlsen, 2005)
18
.   
After a boom in the early 1970s, by the mid-1970s, global competition posed major 
problems for the entire European industry.  This was especially the case for the Norwegian 
industry’s more southerly part with moves into oil platform production occurring in the 1970s 
                                                          
15 . Lorenz, “Organizational Inertia and Competitive.” 
16 . Andersen, “Producing Producers; Shippers, Shipyards,” 464. 
17 . Andersen, “Producing Producers; Shippers, Shipyards,” 480. 
18 . Karlsen, “The dynamics of regional.” 
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as the large Ekofisk oil field was opened up.  From the late 1970s the Norwegian shipbuilding 
industry was exposed to fierce competition 
(http://www.skipsrevyen.no/temaverftsindustrien/)
19 
.  Technological changes in ships and their 
construction facilitated Asian competition and Norwegian costs increased as the currency 
became overvalued due to North Sea oil changing the composition of national income. Despite 
considerable state subsidies, many Norwegian shipyards succumbed and were forced to close.  
 
The industry’s skilled workers constituted a significant part of the long-standing, highly 
independent but cooperation-oriented Norwegian labour movement.  The Iron and Steel Union 
organized employees in iron and steel workshops, shipbuilding and other mechanical industries 
(https://snl.no/Norsk_Jern-_og_Metallarbeiderforbund)
20
.  The nationwide union was 
established in 1891 and affiliated to the general National Labor Union, Landsorganisasjonen, in 
1905.  After serious conflict, the Iron and Steel Union reached a collective agreement with the 
Mechanical Workshop Employers’ Association in 1907 to create Norway’s first modern 
collective agreement (Myran and Fasting, 1955)
21
.  The Norwegian labour movement, 
reflecting its strong links outside the workplace, had a strong orientation towards social 
democracy and the state.  In the period after World War Two, the bulk of the large-scale 
shipbuilding industry of which this yard was typical consciously adopted a ‘British model’ of 
production which underpinned the skilled craftsmen’s (alternatively and revealingly they were 
often dubbed and referred to themselves as ‘tradesmen’, a term applied to those working on 
their own account) position.  Relatively autonomous groups of skilled men formed the majority 
of the workforce, with only small pockets of multi-skilled and unskilled employees (Andersen, 
                                                          
19 . Skipsrevyen.no. 
20 . Store Norske Leksikon. 
21 . Myran and Fasting, Herfra går Skibe. 
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1997)
22
.  In the British context, this system was later polemically denounced by Correlli Barnett, 
a Conservative historian, who roundly condemned it as reflecting excessive and restrictive 
worker control over the productive process (Barnett, 1986)
23
.  In Norway, a broadly similar set 
of arrangements obtained until the 1950s; due to small technological changes, work could even 
shift from the realm of one craft to another (Lorenz, 1994)
24
.  Craft work organisation was 
therefore reflected in a fragmented union structure with eleven different craft-based unions in 
the Solheimsviken yard by mid-1984, although 70-80% of the workers were members of the 
Iron and Steel Union.  Large numbers of small unions which differentiated themselves by skill 
were typical of British and Norwegian shipbuilding until late in their histories.    
The pace of change in the industry’s productive processes was relatively slow.  In the 
Nineteenth Century, skilled workers had been intimately involved in design and work processes, 
leading squads of workers and often themselves investing in shipbuilding projects.  Their role 
and self-image therefore went beyond that of wage-dependent operatives.  The emergence of 
large shipbuilding firms in the Twentieth Century ensconced them as tradesmen with a 
considerable degree of authority and autonomy at work, owning their own tools and organising 
work.  Because of a shortage of formal training, skilled workers developed their skills through 
apprenticeship, practice and mutual learning.  The ‘British model’ of heavy shipbuilding work 
involved relatively autonomous teams of skilled workers from various crafts led by the more 
senior workers, brought together with minimal central planning (Andersen, 1997: 487)
25
. 
Despite attempts to shift towards a more systematically planned and ‘Fordist’ model based on 
Swedish and American practice in the 1960s,  by the 1970s work processes remained 
essentially traditional, with low levels of automation and mechanization in international terms 
                                                          
22 . Andersen, “Producing Producers; Shippers, Shipyards,” 
23 . Barnett, The Audit of War. 
24 . Lorenz, “Organizational inertia and competitive.” 
25. Andersen, “Producing Producers; Shippers, Shipyards,” 487. 
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(Andersen, 1997: 467-8)
26
.  Because of the slow pace of change, craft workers could retain 
much of their position at the centre of work processes and preserve their culture even as it 
became increasingly anachronistic in relation to actual practices.    
Management recognised suitably skilled labour as essential to shipbuilding after 1945, 
because ship safety remained linked to worker input: the quality of welds was important in 
preventing sea water from entering ships’ hulls and in securing vessels’ structural integrity. 
Locked-in stresses caused by poor welding practice could cause fractures, with potentially 
disastrous results (see for example Lane et al., 1951)
27
.  In the skilled worker’s view, the central 
necessity was to ensure that only fully skilled journeymen worked on central processes 
(interview with Ole Egesund).  Crafts were socially exclusive and apprenticeships constituted, 
in effect, extended rites of passage.  Thus, young workers who had not completed an 
apprenticeship were excluded from recognition in the journeymen’s community (Alveng and 
Müller, 1990)
28
; their low rates of pay in relation to those of journeymen meant that once they 
were reasonably proficient in certain processes, there was always a temptation for the employer 
to use them on skilled men’s work (Lorenz, 1994)29.  Once apprenticeships were over, 
craftsmen became members of a ‘club’ which could enforce higher wages than otherwise, but 
at least as importantly, could also exercise high levels of job control and workplace autonomy 
in relation to management and other skilled worker groups (interview with Ole Egesund).  
Craftsmen considered encroachment on their work spheres by either management or less-
skilled workers as threatening to their autonomy at work and ultimately to their job security.  
Management did constantly introduce new working methods and technology that could 
undermine their position (such as, post-1945, the introduction of automatic welding).  Where 
                                                          
26. Andersen, “Producing Producers; Shippers, Shipyards,” 467-68. 
27 . Lane et al., Ships for Victory.   
28 . Alveng and Müller, Verftet i Solheimsviken. 
29 . Lorenz, “Organizational inertia and competitive.” 
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the changes were not fundamental or could be embraced and defined by tradesmen as ‘their’ 
work, these could be contained and allow skilled workers to continue to assert the craft’s 
relevance (interview with Ole Egesund).  The craft’s integrity was associated with demands for 
high levels of democratic involvement both within the workplace and in institutions including 
but not limited to their trade union such as political parties.  Membership of a skilled elite 
engendered a thirst for industrial and political democracy.   
 
Solheimsviken 
The Solheimsviken shipyard and its associated marine engineering works was based in Bergen, 
South-West Norway.  Solheimsviken is situated about one mile south of Bergen’s city centre. 
The  Puddefjorden fjord opens out from the yard’s north and a major bridge crossing this fjord 
connecting the city centre to Bergen west must be passed under to sail north from the yard into 
open sea. At its highest the bridge stretches 30 metres above sea level, so that bigger ships—but, 
crucially, not large oil rigs-- can pass under the bridge located about half a mile north of the 
yard.  This limited the yard’s capacity to tender for construction of complete oil rigs in the 
1980s; discussion of the possibility of moving the yard to an island off Bergen with much better 
access to the open sea never led to action (Dagens Naeringsliv: 06.02.1989)
30
. The large yard 
itself covered about 40 thousand square metres. Shipbuilding and welding halls, each more than 
200 metres long, were supplemented by a marine engineering workshop, an iron foundry, 
slipways and numerous cranes. Most of the modest housing, typically dwellings of some 60 
square metres, built by the firm for their workers were situated less than 300 metres away from 
the yard entrance.  
                                                          
30 . Dagens Naeringsliv,12. 
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The yard was embedded in local industry and the local community, and had long had 
symbolic importance to the country’s industrial profile.  Solheimsviken was established in 1855; 
Laksevaag, its neighbouring sister yard was founded in 1887 (Myran and Fasting 1955)
31
. The 
two firms built and repaired mainly Norwegian ships and merged to form BMV in 1929. At its 
immediate post-1945 peak BMV employed almost three thousand workers, and was the biggest 
employer in Norway besides the state. By 1955 BMV still employed almost two thousand 
employees. From 1945 until 1965 the yard was owned by a group of local Bergen firms active 
in shipping, banking and trade. Aker Group, a Norwegian firm engaged in fishing, engineering 
and construction, owned the yard from 1965-1983. In 1983 a group of some 30 local investors 
within banking, brewery, merchandising and media acquired the majority of BMV equity (Gilje, 
2010)
32
. Solheimsviken (unlike Laksevaag) became a workers’ cooperative in 1985 and 
remained one –albeit with a 50% equity stake from the French company Bouygues from 1988 
onwards--until its closure in 1990.  
In large part, the yard acquired its local and international reputation from its’ 
workforce’s skills. Solheimsviken yard was probably the first shipyard in Norway post-1945 to 
establish a range of specialized departments including a marine engineering department and an 
iron foundry, contributing components for complete ships (Braathen, 1987)
33
.  The craft-based 
production system described above had considerable advantages for local employers.  It 
allowed the recognition of transferable skills across the industry and raised confidence in 
skilled workers’ capacities wherever they were employed. In Solheimsviken, where training 
standards were high, its results were relatively good.  Thus, the Solheimsviken yard developed 
an excellent and externally-verified international reputation for the quality of its products and 
especially its marine engines which derived from the skill and the high degree of collective 
                                                          
31 . Myran and Fasting, Herfra går Skibe. 
32 . Gilje, Skip fra Vik. 
33 . Braathen, Heller Småbruker på Vestlandet. 
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autonomy enjoyed by skilled workers in their construction (Jackson, 2009)
34
.  In 1945 – 55 the 
yard was considered to be nationally leading in one of Norway’s most rapidly expanding 
industries. At Solheimsviken, a vocational training school was created and operated from 1945 
to 1952, to address the shortage of skilled workers after 1945.  In 1955 – 70 Solheimsviken was 
in the forefront in Norway in innovating and producing new middle-sized ship types for an 
international market (Braathen, 1987)
35
.  Traditional histories of the shipyard focused on the 
ships as products, reflecting workers’ sense of pride in their achievement:   
The feeling of having done a job, of having welded in such a way that this steel will 
stand up against any storm at sea, to see «one's own» steel get on top of and be a part of 
this enormous construction - it makes one feel so indescribably happy - you feel it in the 
chest like a wave. One has to stretch one's arms and smile until the corners of the mouth 
click (Alveng and Müller, 1990: 78)
36
. 
The company used a range of methods to stimulate identification with the product, 
recognising that it could be a short step from there to identifying with the company.  It 
practised a form of paternalism, recognising that the value of their skilled employees was 
central to their commercial interests.  In periods of recession management was reluctant to lay 
off its skilled workers. To keep them employed, Solheimsviken built ships on their own 
account, hoping to sell them later, a policy supported by the local community and businessmen, 
who awarded them shipping contracts (Myran and Fasting, 1955: 21, 23, 98)
37
.  The employer, 
as in many company towns, also played a considerable role in the local community.  In 1857 a 
primary school for the workers’ children was established in Solheimsviken, and existed until 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century when the town of Bergen assumed responsibility. 
                                                          
34 . Jackson, “Bergen’s beginnings.”  
35 . Braathen, Heller Småbruker på Vestlandet. 
36. Alveng and Müller, Verftet i Solheimsviken, 78. 
37. Myran and Fasting, Herfra går Skibe. 21, 23, 98. 
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The company, like others, long supported certain rituals associated with ship 
completion. When a ship was launched, workers customarily took the rest of the day off. The 
owner and managers arranged and paid for a huge party for workers and their wives and 
girlfriends, and these were massive social highlights in the local community (Myran and 
Fasting, 1955)
38
. In common with many other large companies with strong links to their local 
communities internationally, BMV renewed the tradition of community involvement by 
supporting leisure events after 1945, and a joint committee with the mandate to allocate money 
for such purposes was established in 1948. One example of their work was a large cabin with 
fifty beds bought in the mountains close to Bergen (Myran and Fasting, 1955)
39
. Bombing of 
the town in World War Two created a great shortage of accommodation post-war and an 
explosion of a German ship in Bergen’s inner at Bryggen in 1944 damaged more than four 
thousand houses (Hartvedt, 1999)
40
.  In response, BMV built and supported the financing of 
new accommodation.   
These wider cooperative measures were also reflected in the workplace.  There was a 
long history of joint management-worker production initiatives and committees from 1945 
right through to 1990.  From 1944 an internal newspaper was published on a regular basis in 
BMV.  Well-resourced and produced, it reflected the yard’s work daily life and workers’ views, 
while harnessing their ideas for improvements in production practices.   
 
Local skilled workers’ culture 
Local shipbuilding workers had their own culture separate from that encouraged by the 
company.   The craftsmen at each of the four Bergen shipyards had their own symbols: flags 
                                                          
38. Myran and Fasting, Herfra går Skibe. 22. 
39. Myran and Fasting, Herfra går Skibe. 
40. Hartvedt, Bergen Byleksikon. 
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and banners showing ships that were exhibited at central turning points in life such as funerals, 
in ceremonies in the city of Bergen on May 17
th
 – Norway’s national day-- and on other special 
occasions. At weddings, these symbols were exhibited behind the bride and the groom.  
If such symbols expressed workers’ shared identity in crystallised form, their workplace 
behavior demonstrated it daily. Hanne Müller, an ethnographic researcher who worked for two 
periods of four months in Solheimsviken in the 1980s—one during 1981and subsequently in 
autumn 1987 during the cooperative (Müller, 2000)
41
 argued that the most skilled and senior 
workers  adopted a quite specific range of behaviours—the ways they walked, stood, talked and 
related to each other:   
The more senior and honored workers feel confident in asserting acceptable and normal 
behavior while young recruits are not. Senior workers have learned how far they can play 
out their personality. The older Viken-worker used their experiences from the private 
world and converted them into subjects of humour at the yard. This created its own 
language… This behavior of moving whilst making jokes is frequently observed among 
the most skilled workers – those being in their most active stage, at the top of their career 
in Viken. This type of behavior was non-existent among the young and new, or among 
the oldest workers (Alveng and Müller, 76)
42
.   
She described quite a different set of behaviours among apprentices:  
To learn implied a repression of one’s own self, one’s ego, in order to be transformed into 
a being fit to enter the fellowship.  The delicate, sheltered and compassionate son or 
husband was ground away. As efficiently as the rust was moved away from the steel 
plates the young worker was polished by the older and more experienced ones through 
roars of laughter and horseplay, until he finally shone as a hardy workmate who could 
                                                          
41. Müller, Indre Erfaring som Antropologisk. 
42. Alveng and Müller, Verftet i Solheimsviken, 76. 
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stand up to anything. As time passed by the young boy gradually became fit to be 
considered a Solheimsviken worker (Alveng and Müller, 74)
43
.   
The skilled workers from different crafts appropriated parts of the yard.  They 
delineated their own ‘domestic’ spaces within the highly industrial world of the yard, creating a 
refuge within an environment where vast spaces, massive ships and powerful machinery 
predominated.  These spaces were the home of and coterminous with the most fundamental 
skilled workers’ institution: the booth.   The booths were built close to workers’ workplaces 
and were where they ate their meals, took short breaks and deliberated among themselves.  
They were strictly the preserve of the craftsmen who built them:   
The booths are quite different from the places where the people work.  Each profession 
has their own and separate booth. It is unthinkable that a welder goes into the sheet metal 
workers’ booths. When workers are in their booth, they never relate to steel and 
equipment. They relate to each other (Alveng and Müller 1990: 51)
44
.   
They were designed as private living rooms, with tables, chairs, wallpaper and 
Christmas decorations (Müller, 2000: 75)
45
.  The small number of women (some 8% of the 
workforce in 1986: Økland 1987)
46
 were a part of the appropriate booth community, but their 
subordinate and sexualized role was symbolically emphasized. There are pictures on the walls 
in the booths.  Many are of naked women with their legs far apart. In a picture in Alveng and 
Müller, (1990)
47
 an almost naked young woman posed in this way. 
The booths were therefore more than a domestic base within the industrial setting.  They 
were also a deliberative institution.  Ole Egesund argued that the individual trades and 
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45. Müller, Indre Erfaring som Antropologisk, 75. 
46. Økland, Når Medarbeiderne eier. 
47. Alveng and Müller, Verftet i Solheimsviken. 
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their booths were of fundamental significance to the workers’ democratic culture.  A 
second, more explicitly democratic institution forged by workers was their union club 
which brought together all the yard’s crafts and unions on a regular basis.  According to 
Egesund, the union club also played a central role in the yard’s daily life under Aker and 
assumed even more importance after 1985 by providing a physical and social space for 
democratic control of the cooperative.  The third institution was the open meeting, used 
by all eleven unions for many years, with several meetings held each year. They were 
held during working hours or immediately afterwards in the large canteen. Customarily, 
all employees, except those absent from work, attended these meetings.    
 
Prior to the cooperative’s formation, a white-collar worker Jørgen Dahl commented to 
the company newspaper Linken (no.3, March 1983)
48
 on the extent both of his personal 
involvement in a wide range of decisions, and that of many other workers:  
I have had the opportunity to join the Board, corporate assembly, work in the union and 
projects in my daily job. I will pay attention to how decisions are made. Everybody seem 
to have a say in almost all decisions (Linken no.3, March 1983)
49
. 
The workers’ democratic machinery formally included the minority of women workers 
in the yard, but they felt in some respects that they were at the workplace community’s margins.  
Four women cleaners who worked at both Laksevaag and Solheimsviken reported to the 
company newspaper in 1983 (Linken no 5, June 1983)
50
 that although they were ‘respected’ by 
the men, some of the men said they “would never let their wife take such a job”.  The women 
referred to their strong relationships between themselves as cleaners as their source of support 
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49. Linken. Internal newspaper. 
50. Linken. Internal newspaper. 
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in the context.  They summed up their feelings by saying that they would like to be “considered 
part of the total function and treated accordingly…we do an important job and contribute to 
individuals’ well-being” (Linken no.5, June 1983)51. A skilled woman carpenter, Eva, struck a 
rather different but consistent note.  Interviewed in the same newspaper’s previous edition, she 
reported satisfaction with her work but added that she would have preferred better physical 
facilities for women such as wardrobes and lavatories (Linken no.4, May 1983)
52
.  It appears 
that the strong union had not prioritised requesting this type of facility.   
For much of the post-war period, management accommodated the skilled worker culture 
and its manifestations.  Braathen (1987)
53
 interviewed 34 engineers and union leaders during 
spring 1987 focusing on the yard’s organization from 1945. Braathen concluded that the unions 
and shop floor workers had strengthened their power in relation to the professional engineers.  
A new CEO in 1967, Osland, sought until he left in 1982 to develop a cooperative climate 
between top management and unions. The shift in power was manifested in frequent and 
regular meetings between the union club and top management where the management and 
operation of the yard was on the agenda. Osland acknowledged that change and prosperity at 
the yard relied heavily on the skilled workers. From 1970 Osland allocated 3 full-time positions 
for union leaders. Osland fostered an egalitarian culture where skilled shop floor workers were 
considered as at least as important to the firm as white collar and professional employees. From 
1968 most engineers had to start as shop floor workers for a few years before they could enter 
their position as professionals (Braathen, 1987)
54
.   
However, the entire operation was already under threat when this research was being 
conducted.   
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The cooperative’s foundation and operation 
To contextualise how the idea of employee ownership arose, we now draw on our interviews to 
examine how employees in Solheimsviken experienced the ownership, management and 
supervision of the firm in the years immediately prior to the cooperative’s formation.  In this 
period, workers felt decreasingly secure in their jobs during and finally, many came to the 
conclusion that the owners had little interest in shipbuilding per se.  For some years prior to 
1982 the Aker Group wished to sell Solheimsviken, and workers therefore felt their jobs to be 
insecure. Yet workers continued to feel faith in their skills and many bought shares when 
invited to do so by the company.  Supervisor Jan W. Holten commented to the company 
newspaper:  
I have signed on the list of share buyers. First and foremost I think we all have to do what 
can be done to alleviate the bad times that we as a yard go through. In addition I am 
strongly attached to the yard in Solheimsviken. I have worked here for 36 years, and I 
cannot imagine a better place to work. The staff is highly skilled, all cooperate very well 
and the social climate and environment is very good. It is very encouraging to see how 
the youths handle our problems and challenges. Among my colleagues we have several 
newly-weds who have just started a family, and they have little money. But I have 
noticed several of those youngsters subscribing to the list to share purchases for an 
amount equal to one month's rent (Linken no 3, December 1982)
55
.   
That a manager should comment in this way was predictable, but his reference to 
younger workers is revealing.  Moreover, interest in the share offer was not limited to managers.   
                                                          
55. Linken. Internal newspaper. 
 21 
 
As Hakon Olsen, a carpenter, commented to the company newspaper on why he subscribed to a 
share issue:  
I feel strongly attached to the workshop and yard in Solheimsviken, and I really believe 
in a future for the yard despite the difficult times we have endured. This faith is not only 
based on wishful thinking. I know for sure there is a good professional attitude and skills 
among workers here and I have confidence in the way the restructuring of the yard is 
being managed (Linken no 3, December 1982)
56
.   
In 1983-84 Solheimsviken was owned by about 30 local firms as described above (Gilje, 
2010)
57
.  This period was characterised by a passive board and conflicts over who should be 
CEO. The local owners had no wish to secure new shipbuilding and ship repair contracts and 
were suspected of simply wishing to realise the site’s considerable value as property in 
Bergen’s centre.  When the finance and investment firm Investa estimated the Solheimsviken 
land to be worth 130 million Norwegian Kroner, they exacerbated workers’ sense of insecurity.  
Their suspicions proved well-founded. In mid-1984 all employees were fired.  The owners 
wanted to shut Solheimsviken.  
The idea that employees might become owners was first raised by Kjell Høibraaten in a 
local meeting of the Iron and Steel Union immediately after the sackings.  He also proposed 
that the social and welfare fund (see below) could buy shares in Solheimsviken. No other forms 
of ownership were discussed but all employees were invited to buy shares individually in order 
to expand the firm’s equity, recalling the practice of a century previously. The idea won 
support among all participants at the local union board and was subsequently introduced to all 
employees at an open meeting. The attitude among employees at these 1984 open meetings was 
that they believed in Solheimsviken.  The workers stressed that the efforts they made to secure 
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the yard’s future was in order to keep their jobs, but their arguments also transcended that.  
They might have jobs if the land were put to another use, but they wished to preserve their 
skills and the local community.  During the initial open meeting, all employees supported 
collective ownership except one former union leader who left the meeting in protest.  In 
common with a strand of opinion in trade unions internationally (Ozarow and Croucher, 
2014)
58
, he felt that employee ownership could undermine the unions’ roles as instruments to 
protect workers’ interests.  
The employees collectively owned about Norwegian Kroner 1 million through a social 
and welfare fund, legally organized as a private foundation controlled by the County Governor 
of Hordaland.  Originally established in 1981-2, its purpose was to support the social interests 
and welfare of all employees. The fund was originally established by agreement between the 
company and the unions, and was productivity-related.  Where less working hours than 
budgeted were spent on a ship building or repair project, part of the cost saving was paid into 
the fund. The first project after its establishment generated a contribution to the fund since only 
790 thousand working hours were required as compared to an estimated 820 thousand working 
hours.  Prior to 1985, no money was disbursed from the fund (interview with Kjell Høibraaten). 
The fund was owned and managed by all employees collectively, and no individual employee 
had any individual rights in it. Those who stopped working at Solheimsviken lost their legal 
link to it. All of the fund’s board members were employees, elected at the open meeting. 
In January 1985 the social and welfare fund bought shares in Solheimsviken, 
purchasing 90 percent of the equity.  All employees were included, not simply the 97% who 
were union members.  Once the cooperative had been formed, the workers’ democratic 
machinery took on the essential new role of governance.  The union club was linked to the 
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workforce via the booths and machinery was established to maintain productivity.  Ole 
Egesund:  
Every week booth groups used to have meetings with the head of the union club and a 
productivity secretary in cases where the group was behind production schedule. It was 
the union club that actually proposed this arrangement, and the productivity secretary was 
hired in 1985. And actions were planned at the meeting to keep up with the schedule. 
The union club now formally operated as an instrument of control over management, in 
the account given by Egesund:    
(It) organized open meetings among all workers to inform and discuss common firm 
issues.  We as union club along with the workers controlled the firm. Much of this has to 
do with the fact that we were co-owners. On a daily basis I showed up at the CEO’s 
office to keep up with what was going on. We agreed on most issues, but in a few cases, I 
instructed him what to do on behalf of the union club.  He never dared to oppose me, 
because in reality I represented the co-owners.  And it was me and Kjell (Høibraaten—
authors) who recruited the CEO.  
 Older skilled workers identified more strongly with the company than their younger 
counterparts, as a survey we conducted in October 1986 demonstrated.  416 questionnaires 
were distributed to workers in the cooperative, with a 34 per cent response rate, an acceptable 
rate in line with classical work on response rates (Baruch 1999).  There were no systematic 
biases; for example, there were 7.1% women in the sample although less educated and lower 
graded workers were slightly underrepresented.  Organizational identification was measured by 
four items from the 15-item Organizational Identification Questionnaire (Mowday, Porter and 
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Steers 1979)
59
. The construct has a fair degree of uni-dimensionality with a Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient at .79 for the following four items:   
 I talk to my friends about this company as a great place to work.  
 I find that my values and those of the company are very similar. 
 I really care about the fate of this company. 
 I’m proud to tell others that I'm working for this company.  
  
 Means and standard deviations for the variables are provided at the end of the paper in 
Table 1.  The results show that organisational identification was closely associated with 
seniority. Workers with higher seniority identified significantly more strongly with the yard 
than those with shorter employment histories.   
However, workers were governing an increasingly ailing firm.  In common with much 
West European heavy shipbuilding, the company’s competitive position worsened throughout 
the late 1980s.  From the early 1980s through to 1987, the yard focused on building oil rig 
modules, bringing very considerable changes to the yard as both a physical and associative 
entity.  By December 1987, there was no money available to repair broken machinery and the 
yard completely changed its appearance. One of the slipways was torn down. Parts of the 
yard were rented out and used for other activities.   Alveng and Müller, working in the 
yard at this time, remarked:  
When you enter the yard in the morning something has disappeared. The solid ties 
between the person and the area are torn up…..every day the workers noticed 
how their old shipbuilder identity was being smashed to pieces. They realized 
that times were different, «the fun was gone», as they expressed it. Whole 
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communication areas among workers were disappearing (Alveng and Müller (1990: 
82-83)
60
.   
Crucially, the booths were dismantled to make space for renting out.  Although at 
one level a simple recognition of change, it also meant the disappearance of industrial 
democracy’s basic unit. 
Reorganisations eroded work groups, the basis of democracy. The shift from 
producing ships to oil modules, a process which had been under way well before the 
cooperative’s foundation, was accompanied by the re-organization of the yard from being 
fully functionally-based to being a project-based organization (Fauske and Høyem, 1987)
61
. 
Most workers changed work groups and physically moved to new locations in the yard.  
Managers from outside the yard acquired considerable control.  Managers and key 
personnel in the project organization were approved by the contracting company Statoil. 
Planning was mainly executed by external consultants due to a lack of appropriate 
competencies among the staff. Finally, and further reducing workers’ autonomy, Statoil 
established their own organization at the yard to quality assure work processes and 
products.  
Soon after the cooperative’s foundation, the quality of democratic involvement declined. 
Roger Ingvaldsen explained, providing a rather different perspective to that of Egesund above:  
In the old days problem solving and how to do our job was up to me and my colleagues. 
But that is history. Nowadays we are being treated as if we have no brain to think with. 
There is no discussion and nothing to discuss. We are just being told what to do and how 
to do it. The groups in the booths terminated as we were moved to work on the oil 
modules. The only discussions nowadays take place in the canteen with some of my good 
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old colleagues from the booths. And due to the financially strained situation here at the 
yard now, there are no discussions at the open meetings anymore as opposed to 1984-85 
when the workers became owners and long before that. Those open meetings are less 
frequent, and most of the time the CEO and the union leaders inform everyone about the 
financial situation and the yard’s prospects. 
Workers at the yard had experienced a vigorous democracy until 1985 at the latest.  
Paradoxically, soon after the cooperative’s formation, workers had little say in its operation.   
The cooperative sought a partner and in April 29, 1988 the French firm Bouygues 
bought 50 per cent of the equity while the other 50 per cent remained in employee hands.    The 
French were enticed by the location in relation to the North Sea and by CEO Kjell Høibraaten’s 
vision for the company to make specialized ships (Dagens Naeringsliv February 6, 1989)
62
.  
Nevertheless, the poor financial position meant that the cooperative had to continue a practice 
which had begun earlier.  Workers were hired out to other workplaces where their skills could 
be sold: to other yards, to the Aker Stord oil platform-producing yard outside Bergen, North 
Sea Oil platforms, and elsewhere.  They therefore worked in different, more international or at 
least less local environments.   The previous custom had been for workers to work at 
Solheimsviken for their entire working life.  Thus, we find a local newspaper reporting 
(Aftenposten October 5, 1985)
63
 that not more than half of the yard’s employees were currently 
employed; that those who were worked on a series of short assignments and that the company 
hoped that number to be laid off would not exceed the current 240.   
As Kjell Høibraaten elaborated:  
The mobility of the work force grew from 1984.  This was not due to the start-up of the 
worker co-operative……..The last ship was built at Solheimsviken in 1983.  In order to 
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keep the staff busy, many workers needed to work for other companies at other sites.  A 
Viken-worker was very competent, and we had a good training department at the yard. It 
was easy to hire the workers for jobs outside the yard. From 1984 a major part of the staff 
worked for hire in the North Sea and at other yards in Norway...maybe we are talking 
about 30-50 per cent of the staff working outside the yard. 
A simultaneous shift in skills requirements also threatened older workers’ status within 
the workforce.  The issue was partly physical and partly technical.  Older workers were 
physically and psychologically reluctant to embrace the new type of work, which could involve 
new skills and working at heights with oil modules.  Equipment, work procedures and quality 
control procedures all became more demanding.  Workers in their 30s were optimally suited to 
manipulating heavy oil platform components and equipment.  After the age of forty, the 
certificates welders required to work on more difficult work became harder to maintain and 
they then had to be moved to simpler jobs.  On these tasks, their earnings fell below those of 
the younger workers.  The value and status of a young highly-skilled welder on the other hand 
was now considerable. Senior workers’ old shipbuilding skills were becoming increasingly 
outmoded.   The old feelings of community, equality and companionship in a fixed and well-
recognised craft and of a common language and identity were dissipated.   A gap emerged 
between the actual nature of the workforce and union leaders’ recognition that although 
shipbuilding work could still be sought, it was important to prioritise seeking oil module work 
since this was both available and suitable at least for younger workers (interview with Ole 
Egesund).   
Nevertheless, and despite the erosion of the senior skilled workers’ capacity to exercise 
direct pressure, the limitations to their actual capacities and preparedness to adapt were also 
abundantly evident.  The company’s management was therefore caught in a difficult situation if 
not a dilemma: how to represent the interests of different sections of the workforce.  Could it 
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present itself as both a shipbuilding and an oil module producing firm?  This was important 
background to Kjell Høibraaten holding out the prospect of new shipbuilding work being 
acquired in early 1989 (Dagens Naeringsliv January 31, 1989)
64
 while complaining of the 
subsidies enjoyed by competitors from other nations, notably Japan.  Simultaneously, 
Solheimsviken invested heavily to secure the contract for constructing modules for the Sleipner 
field, but in March it became clear that this had been awarded outside of Norway.  Increasing 
debt meant that the Norwegian Bank eventually lost patience and required repayment (Dagens 
Naeringsliv, May 30, 1990)
65
.  As Bouygues were also unwilling to commit further finance, the 
yard went into bankruptcy and closed.  Bergens Tidende, the local newspaper, reported on 7 
August 1991
66
 that the yard was being stripped of its physical assets.  Kjell Sorensen reported 
that many of the skilled workers had found alternative work and that the mass unemployment 
that had been feared had not in fact materialized.   Nevertheless, a particular workers’ culture 
had disappeared.  
It may be argued that the workers’ culture and associated democratic institutions had 
contributed in some ways to the cooperative’s failure by limiting the range of strategies that 
appeared plausible to its leaders.  Unlike its previous partner yard Laksevaag, the cooperative 
adopted a strategy of only partial adaptation to the requirements of North Sea Oil, which meant 
it retained essentially redundant shipbuilding capacities.  The culture of work was based on the 
exercise of shipbuilding crafts at a time when these were becoming increasingly dysfunctional 
to the yard’s survival.  Yet while the culture encouraged the cooperative’s leaders to present the 
yard as a shipbuilding concern, it did not prevent them seeking and obtaining work on oil rigs.  
Moreover, both the scale of the investment required (for example to move the yard) and the 
history of West European shipbuilding’s decline suggest that the scope for the cooperative to 
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devise a meaningful survival strategy was in any case extremely limited.  Global forces had 
intervened.   
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Our central strand of argument was that the skilled workers’ culture was linked to industrial 
democratic impulses.  This contributed to a broader national labour movement which was one 
of the strongest in Europe throughout the post-1945 period.  Corelli Barnett’s assertions about 
British shipbuilding unions (inter alia) exerting excessive industrial power, thereby hampering 
modernisation should be seen in these wider democratic and international contexts.  We have 
shown how skilled Norwegian workers shared many of the same impulses as their British 
counterparts and have argued that workers’ culture had democratic and not simply ‘restrictive’ 
components.   
The Solheimsviken cooperative may be understood as a final manifestation of a culture 
which fostered a powerful wish among the skilled men to exercise significant democratic 
control at work.   The culture was based on respect for craft skills and had a range of 
behavioural and symbolic aspects supporting its institutional manifestations.  Collective 
identity was manifested in a complex of signifiers: the ways that individuals conducted 
themselves at work, the domestication of the industrial environment, assertion of workers’ 
realm within it and a web of rituals and symbols.  These were the basis for a well-developed set 
of institutions that reached their apogee at the point of the cooperative’s formation.  The skilled 
workers’ cultural tradition was in certain respects extensive in that it was buttressed by its links 
to the local community and enjoyed a wider set of associations characteristic of the industry as 
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a whole.  These associations played a significant role in the cooperative’s foundation but 
ultimately could not sustain it in the face of the material reality of intense global competition.  
The culture was at best ambiguous in its limited propensity to involve those considered as out-
groups, notably women and young workers who either could not or had not yet ‘achieved’ 
acceptability to the older male skilled workers.  At worst, it was diminishing and negative to 
those who were excluded.  At its core, the skilled workers’ culture was founded on their 
identity as part of an exclusive group of skilled men and its limitations were its obverse.   
The culture of skilled work at Solheimsviken was deeply embedded but was ultimately 
swamped by processes that began before the cooperative was founded, by industrial changes 
that would have been recognised by the craft workers of a century before.  They had long 
feared rapid and fundamental technological upheaval for its potential to undermine and 
ultimately destroy their crafts.  Ironically, the beneficiaries of this cataclysmic change when it 
arrived were the younger workers who had previously only been admitted to the ‘fellowship’ 
after apprenticeship and who, even as young journeymen, were simply tolerated.  For them, the 
old solidarities soon constituted little more than a memory of the past.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography  
Alveng, Dag, and Hanne Müller. Verftet i Solheimsviken. Bergen, Norway: Alma Mater, 1990. 
Arbeidernes faglige landsorganisasjon. Overenskomst om Produksjonsutvalg mellom 
Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon og Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening. Oslo, Norway: 
Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1950. 
Andersen, Håkon With (1997), Producing producers; shippers, shipyards and the cooperative 
infrastructure of the Norwegian maritime complex since 1850.  In Charles F. Sabel and 
Jonathan Zeitlin (eds) World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western 
Industrialization, Cambridge University Press: 461-500. 
Barnett, Corelli. The Audit of War: the Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation.  
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986. 
Bergens Tidende (1991), (Local newspaper), 7 August. 
Biggs, Lindy. Review of Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds). “World of Possibilities: 
Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization,” Technology and Culture 41, no. 
2 (2000): 366-368.  
Braathen, Einar. Heller Småbruker på Vestlandet enn Husmann under Fred Olsen. Ingeniører 
og Arbeidere ved BMV Solheimsviken gjennom Modernisering, Konserndannelse, Omstilling. 
Thesis. Bergen, Norway: University of Bergen, 1987. 
 32 
 
Clegg, Hugh A., Fox, Alan, and Alan F. Thompson. A History of British Trade Unions (1964, 
1987, 1994).  Three volumes: 1989-1910 (1964); 1911-1933 (1987); H.A.Clegg: 1934-1951 
(1994). 
Craig, Ben, and John Pencavel. “Participation and Productivity: A Comparison of Worker 
Cooperatives and Conventional Firms in the Plywood Industry.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Microeconomics (1995): 121-174. 
Dagens Naeringsliv (1986), (Norwegian newspaper), 6 February. 
Dagens Naeringsliv (1989), (Norwegian newspaper), 31 January. 
Dagens Naeringsliv (1990), (Norwegian newspaper), 30 May. 
Fauske, Rolf Morten, and Lasse Høyem. Styring og Organisering av et Offshoreprosjekt. 
Statoil Module D.11. ved Solheimsviken AS. Master’s thesis. Bergen: Norwegian School of 
Economics, 1987. 
Gherardi, Silvia, and Atilio Masiero. “The Impact of Organizational Culture in Life-Cycle and 
Decision-Making Processes in Newborn Cooperatives.” Economic and Industrial Democracy 8, 
no. 3 (1987), 323-347. 
Gilje, H. Skip fra Vik og Våg – Historien om Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder. Haugesund, 
Norway: Vormedal Forlag, 2010. 
Hartvedt, Gunnar Hagen. Bergen Byleksikon. Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1999. 
Jackson, Richard.” Bergen’s Beginnings.” Rolls-Royce Magazine, no. 3 (2009): 30-32.  
Karlsen, Asbjørn. “The Dynamics of Regional Specialization and Cluster Formation: Dividing 
Trajectories of Maritime Industries in two Norwegian Regions.” Entrepreneurship and 
regional development: an international journal 17, no. 5 (2005): 313-338. 
 33 
 
Lane, F.C., with Coll, B.C., Fischer, G.J., and D. B. Tyler. Ships for Victory. A History of 
Shipbuilding under the US Maritime Commission in World War Two. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1951. 
Linken (1982), Internal newspaper for Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder. No. 3, December. 
Linken (1983), Internal newspaper for Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder. No. 3, March. 
Linken (1983), Internal newspaper for Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder. No. 4, May. 
Linken (1983), Internal newspaper for Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder. No. 5, June. 
Lorenz, E.H. (1994), Organizational inertia and competitive decline: the British cotton, 
shipbuilding and car industries, 1945-1975 Industrial and Corporate Change 3 (2): 379-403.  
Mowday, R. T., Steers, R. M., and L. W. Porter. “The Measurement of Organizational 
Commitment.  Journal of Vocational Behavior 14, (1979): 224-247.   
Müller, H. Indre Erfaring som Antropologisk Blikk og Stemme. Dr.philos. dissertation. Bergen, 
Norway: University of Bergen, 2000. 
Myran, H. and Fasting K. Herfra går Skibe. Aksjeselskapet Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder 
1855–1955. Bergen: BMV, 1955. 
Ozarow, Daniel, and Richard Croucher. “Workers' Self-management, Recovered Companies 
and the Sociology of Work.” Sociology 48, no. 5 (2014): 989-1006. 
Shershneva, E., and J. Feldhoff. The Culture of Labour in the Transformation Process.  
Empirical Studies in Russian Enterprises. New York: Peter Lang, 1998. 
Skipsrevyen (2010), (Norwegian newspaper), 9 November, (http://www.skipsrevyen.no/ 
temaverftsindustrien/). 
 34 
 
Smircich, L. “Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis.” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1983): 339-358.   
Store Norske Leksikon. 2015 https://snl.no/Norsk_Jern-_og_Metallarbeiderforbund. 
Webb, Sidney, and Beatrice Potter Webb. The History of Trade Unionism. London: Printed by 
the authors specially for the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, 1898. 
Rothschild, Joyce. “Workers’ Cooperatives and Social Enterprise. A Forgotten Route to Social 
Equity and Democracy.” American Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 1 (2009): 1023-41.  
Wuthnow, R., and M. Witten. “New Directions in the Study of Culture.”  Annual Review of 
Sociology 14, (1988): 49-67.   
Økland, Gunnar Magne. Når Medarbeiderne eier Bedriften: Spiller dette noen Rolle for deres 
Organisasjonstilknytning? Thesis. Bergen, Norway: Norwegian School of Economics, 1987. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Worker seniority and identification with the company:  
means, standard deviations, and correlations
a 
     Variable    Mean    s.d.  1  2 
1. Identification     4,81  0,885  - 
2. Seniority    18,27          11,750        .208*  - 
 
Notes: 
a  
n = 141 
*p < 0,05  
 
  
 
